Assumption Categories

IdentifierAdmin
Descriptive NameAdministrator assumptions
DescriptionThis category of assumptions covers the motives, attitude, competence, and operations of System Administrator personnel.
EditorialCategory includes considerations of whether the administrator is hostile or nice, local or remote.

Subordinate Assumptions and Categories
A.Auth_Sys_Admin - Authenticated administrators
A.Remote_Admin - Remote adminstration
AC.Admin_Attitude - System administrator attitudes
AC.Admin_Motive - System administrator motives

IdentifierAdmin_Attitude
Descriptive NameSystem administrator attitudes
DescriptionThis category of assumptions covers the attitudes of System Administrators.
Editorial

Subordinate Assumptions and Categories
A.Admin_Errors - Potential for administrator errors
A.Competent_Admin - Competent system administrators
A.No_Abuse_By_Admin - No abusive system administrators
A.Poor_Trained_Admin - Untrained system administrators

IdentifierAdmin_Motive
Descriptive NameSystem administrator motives
DescriptionThis category of assumptions covers the motives of System Administrators.
Editorial

Subordinate Assumptions and Categories
A.Hostile_Sys_Admin - Hostile system administrators
A.Negligent_Admin - Negligent system administrators
A.Well_Behaved_Admin - Well behaved system administrators

IdentifierCommunications
Descriptive NameCommunications assumptions
DescriptionThis category of assumptions covers communications to and from the TOE.
EditorialMay be used to include or exclude threats by remote threat agents.

Subordinate Assumptions and Categories
A.Acc_to_Comms - Physical protection of communications
A.Eavesdrop_by_Out - Eavesdropping by outsiders
A.Peer - Connectivity to other systems

IdentifierData
Descriptive NameAssumed protection
DescriptionThis category of assumptions covers the protection of security-relevant data.
Editorial

Subordinate Assumptions and Categories
A.Acc_Ovrwrit_SysData - Corruption of system data
A.Access_to_Passwords - User access to passwords
A.Admin_Cor_Usr_Data - Corruption of data in transit

IdentifierPhysical
Descriptive NamePhysical security assumptions
DescriptionThis category of assumptions covers the physical protection of the facility and the TOE.
EditorialHelps identify threat agents, helps determine which threats are countered by the environment.

Subordinate Assumptions and Categories
A.Phys_Acs_to_Out - Physical access
A.Prot_Against_Nature - Natural disaster protection
A.Prot_Agnst_Pwr_Fail - Power failure protection
A.Prot_of_Comm - Communications protection
A.Protect_From_Out - TOE protection from outsiders

IdentifierProcedures
Descriptive NameProcedural security
DescriptionThis category of assumptions covers procedures to ensure the proper administration of the TOE.
Editorial

Subordinate Assumptions and Categories
A.Admin_Docs - Documentation for administrators
A.Admin_Virus_Check - Virus checking procedures
A.Dispose_User_Data - Disposal of user data
A.Password_Management - Password management promoting user compliance
A.Review_Audit_Log - Administrators review audit logs

IdentifierRoot
Descriptive NameAssumptions of secure operations
DescriptionVarious Assumptions about the operating environment.
EditorialThis assumption contains all assumption categories explicitly and thus implicitly all assumptions.  In the corresponding links table, Root is not explicitly linked to individual assumptions.

Subordinate Assumptions and Categories
AC.Admin - Administrator assumptions
AC.Communications - Communications assumptions
AC.Data - Assumed protection
AC.Physical - Physical security assumptions
AC.Procedures - Procedural security
AC.User - User assumptions

IdentifierUser
Descriptive NameUser assumptions
DescriptionThis category of assumptions covers the motives, attitude, and access of users.
EditorialThis category helps determine what kinds of users are there.

Subordinate Assumptions and Categories
A.Coop_User - Cooperative users
A.No_Bypass_Security - TOE-Environment separation
A.Outsider_Hi - Expert threat agents
A.Outsider_Low - Laymen threat agents
A.Outsider_Med - Proficient threat agents
A.Remote_Access - Remote users
A.User_Access - User access
A.User_Virus_Scan - Software virus scanning
AC.User_Motive - User motives

IdentifierUser_Motive
Descriptive NameUser motives
DescriptionThis category of assumptions covers the motives of users.
Editorial

Subordinate Assumptions and Categories
A.Hostile_User - Hostile users
A.Trusted_User - Trusted users
A.User_Mistakes - Mistakes by users